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Abstract
We generalize a simple New Keynesian model and show that a flattening of the
Phillips curve reduces the size of fiscal multipliers at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on
the nominal interest rate. The factors behind the flatting are consistent with micro-
and macroeconomic empirical evidence: it is a result of, not a higher level of price
rigidity, but an increase in the degree of strategic complementarity in price-setting –
invoked by the assumption of a specific instead of an economy-wide labour market, and
decreasing instead of constant-returns-to-scale. In normal times, the efficacy of fiscal
policy and resulting multipliers tends to be small because negative wealth effects crowd
out consumption, and because monetary policy endogenously reacts to fiscally-driven
increases in inflation and output by raising rates, offsetting part of the stimulus. In
times of a binding ZLB and a fixed nominal rate, an increase in (expected) inflation
instead lowers the real rate, leading to larger fiscal multipliers. Conditional on being in
a ZLB-environment, under a flatter Phillips curve, increases in expected inflation are
lower, so that fiscal multipliers at the ZLB tend to be lower. Finally, we also discuss
the role of solution methods in determining the size of fiscal multipliers.
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1 Introduction
After the introduction of the $750 billion US fiscal stimulus package in 2009 there has
been a renewed interest in the effectiveness of fiscal policy in the environment of ultra-
low interest rates. Several authors show that the size of fiscal multipliers is significantly
higher when the economy is at a zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal interest rate
(see Eggertsson (2011), Erceg and Linde (2014), Christiano et al. (2011) or Woodford
(2011)), making a case for the ability of fiscal policy to curb the adverse effects of financial
crisis. The economic consensus on fiscal multipliers in normal times is, that they tend
to be small. This is for two reasons: one, increases in government expenditure need to
be financed, and thus come with a negative wealth effect, which crowds out consumption
and decreases demand; two, a fiscal expansion, increasing inflation and output, triggers
an endogenous response of the monetary authority, which raises interest rates, offsetting
some of the expansionary effect of fiscal policy. In times when the economy is at the zero
lower bound, such endogenous dampening response of monetary policy is absent, as the
nominal interest rate stuck at the lower bound and thus constant; in such case, an increase
in (expected) inflation, resulting from a fiscal expansion, leads to a drop in the real interest
rate, which further stimulates demand and thus increases fiscal multipliers.
This paper extends the New Keynesian model of Eggertsson (2011) and studies the size
of various types of fiscal multipliers, in normal times, when the nominal interest rate is
positive, and when the economy is at the zero lower bound. We calibrate our model to the
US economy and study four different types of fiscal multipliers: a government spending, a
payroll tax, a sales tax, and a financial asset tax multiplier. We document that the size
of fiscal multipliers at the ZLB crucially depends on the slope of the Phillips curve, with
a flatter Phillips curve being associated with smaller multipliers. This is because in the
context of the New Keynesian model an, e.g., increase in government spending can raise
output owing to a rise in expected inflation which, at the zero lower bound, decreases the
real interest rate, stimulating consumption and output. A flatter Phillips curve attenuates
the inflation channel and, thus, decreases the value of the multiplier. A sufficiently flat
Phillips curve, consistent with recent empirical estimates, delivers a spending multiplier at
or below one and a consumption tax cut multiplier that is strictly below one.
The reasons behind the flattening of the Phillips curve that we consider in our model
are consistent with both the macroeconomic and microeconomic empirical evidence. In
particular, we do not obtain a flatter Phillips curve from employing a higher degree of
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nominal rigidity; instead, it results from an increase in the degree of strategic complemen-
tarity in price-setting, invoked in the model through assumptions of (i) a specific labour
market1 and (ii) decreasing returns-to-scale in production. There is a growing macroeco-
nomic literature suggesting a flattening of the Phillips curve (see, e.g., Blanchard et al.,
2015, among others), i.e. a weaker link between economic activity and inflation. The rea-
sons and implications of the flattening of the Phillips curve have been primarily examined
for the (lack of) inflation after the crisis or more generally, for monetary policy strategy
(Blanchard et al., 2015). We document that this consideration is equally consequential
for fiscal multipliers. This macroeconomic literature on the flattening of the Phillips curve
is supported by a growing microeconomic literature suggesting that strategic complemen-
tarity is an important factor in how firms set prices, and that a high degree of strategic
complementarity results in a flat Phillips curve (Coricelli and Horvath (2010), Woodford
(2003)). Using micro-level Belgian consumer prices data, Amiti et al. (2019) develop a
general theoretical framework and empirical identification strategy to directly estimate
firm price responses to changes in prices of their competitors. Their results suggest an
elasticity of more than one-third in response to the price changes of its competitors (i.e.
strategic complementarity) and an elasticity of nearly two-thirds in response to its own
cost shocks. Interestingly, this ’strategic complementarity’ elasticity increases to one-half
for large firms.2
Our results suggest that the empirically relevant reasons for a flattening of the Phillips
curve, that we incorporate in our model, lead to smaller fiscal multipliers at the ZLB. More
generally, we present detailed results for multipliers for our four types of fiscal instruments,
in both normal and ZLB times, and show how they are influenced by the different settings
1In general, the labour market can be modeled either as an economy-wide or specific labour market. An
economy-wide labour market (one type of labour for all firms) implies strategic substitutability in price-
setting i.e. an individual firm which observes a rise in the prices of goods of the other firms will lower the
price of its own good. In contrast, a specific factor market leads to the synchronisation of prices across
firms which implies a case of strategic complementarity.
2In addition, based on a survey conducted for nearly 11 000 firms in the Euro Area, Fabiani et al.
(2006) find that the prices of around 30 percent of Euro Area firms are shaped by competitors’ prices, while
the remaining 70 percent of the firms set prices according to markup (see Alvarez et al., 2006, where this
result is discussed, too). Overall, this empirical evidence suggests that strategic complementarity plays
an important role for firms’ price setting behaviour. Strategic complementarity in price-setting also helps
to jointly match the micro-evidence on the frequency of firms’ price adjustment and the low estimates on
the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) (see Linde and Trabandt (2018)). See Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) who estimated a duration of price rigidity is about 2-3 quarters using US micro data.
Estimates on the slope of the NKPC vary between 0.009-0.04 (see, e.g., Adolfson et al. (2005), Altig et al.
(2011), Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2003)).
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of specific versus economy-wise labour market and constant versus decreasing returns to
scale.3 We also present evidence that shows that the level of steady-state government
spending-to-GDP ratio affects the size of the resulting multiplier.4 Finally, we present
results from robustness checks in terms of the solution method used to compute fiscal mul-
tipliers, considering multipliers that are computed not only from a linear solution method
but also from more accurate global solution methods.
Our work is closely related to Boneva et al. (2016) and Ngo (2019), who also study
the consequences of a flattening of the Phillips curve for fiscal multipliers, which, how-
ever, in their setting is due to an increase in price rigidity parameters. Two further,
recently published papers also emphasize the importance of the slope of the Phillips curve
for the conduct of monetary policy at the zero lower bound, or for the value of the fiscal
multiplier. Belgibayeva and Horvath (2019) explore how the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity in price-setting affects optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with
wage and price setting frictions. Linde and Trabandt (2018) find that strategic comple-
mentarity, introduced via a Kimball consumption basket instead of the constant-elasticity-
of-substitution (CES) aggregator, accounts for the difference between the value of the
multiplier calculated from the linear and non-linear solution of the model.
Other related contributions include Miao and Ngo (2019), who find that the multipliers
behave differently in the non-linear Calvo and Rotemberg models. Surprisingly, they find
that the mutliplier is increasing (decreasing) with the duration of the ZLB in the Calvo
(Rotemberg) model. They also find that the spending multiplier is a non-linear function
of the persistence of the government spending shock. Eggertsson and Singh (2016) argue
that the multipliers do not differ a lot across the linear and non-linear New Keynesian
3Our model version with decreasing returns in labour is equivalent to a model with firm-specific fixed
capital (and variable input labour), which Altig et al. (2011) consider important in reconciling the micro-
evidence on the frequency of price changes with the macro evidence on the slope of the Phillips curve.
The decreasing returns to scale of technology implies a flatter Phillips curve, again giving rise to smaller
multipliers compared to the constant-returns-to-scale assumption of Eggertsson (2011).
4Many influential papers, such as Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011), assume a zero government
spending-to-GDP ratio when calculating fiscal multipliers. However, US post-war data show that the
government spending-to-GDP ratio ranges between 17-20 per cent. Not accounting for a positive government
spending-to-GDP ratio distorts the correct size of the private consumption-to-GDP ratio based on the
aggregate resource constraint and has an impact on the effective value of the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (IES). Using our model, we show that allowing for positive government spending-to-GDP ratio
has non-negligible effects on the size of the government spending multiplier. Interestingly, this issue is largely
overlooked in the empirical literature. For example, the existing meta-analyses on the fiscal multipliers do
not mention the possible effect of government spending-to-GDP ratio on the size of multiplier (Gechert
(2015) and Gechert and Rannenberg (2018)).
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models (with either Calvo or Rotemberg pricing) as long as we consider empirically realistic
calibration of the models. Boneva et al. (2016) also show the sign and size of the multipliers
with respect to the slope of the NKPC and the duration of the zero lower bound using the
linear and non-linear New Keynesian model with Rotemberg pricing. Importantly, they
show that the labour tax cut multiplier is negative for empirically realistic durations of
the zero lower bound in the linear as well as the non-linear New Keynesian model. Ngo
(2019) uses US data to calculate the unconditional probability of hitting the zero lower
bound and calibrates a model with occasionally binding zero lower bound constraint. He
finds a government spending multiplier of around 1.25, which is larger than the one in the
model without occasionally binding constraint or transient government spending shocks.
He also confirms the finding of Miao and Ngo (2019) regarding the nonlinearity of the
multiplier with respect to the persistence of the government spending shock. The focus
of our paper differentiates us from the previous papers. In particular, we explore how
the recent flattening of the Phillips curve as resulting from a higher degree of strategic
complementarity, and show that this affects the size of fiscal multipliers significantly.
Hills and Nakata (2018) show that the government spending multiplier is very sensitive
to the inclusion of interest rate smoothing in the Taylor rule. Once one allows for inertia in
the interest rate rule, the multiplier decreases from 1.9 to 0.5. Leeper et al. (2017) estimate
fiscal multipliers using Bayesian methods on US data. With several combinations of model
specifications and different priors they find impact multipliers of about 1.4. Further, they
find that multipliers are much higher in a regime with passive monetary and active fiscal
policy relative to a regime with active monetary and passive fiscal policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out our modelling framework, while
section 3 describes the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 discusses intuition and economic
channels at play to help interpret fiscal multipliers. Section 5 focuses on the calibration of
the model. Section 6 contains the numerical results as well as an explanation of the sign
and magnitude of fiscal multipliers. Section 7 presents results from a non-linear solution
method to verify robustness of our results. Section 8 provides concluding remarks. An
Appendix with the model derivations can be found at the end of the paper.
2 The log-linear model
We log-linearise a basic New Keynesian model as in Eggertsson (2011) around its non-
stochastic zero inflation steady state. The New-Keynesian IS curve along with the log-
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linear aggregate resource constraint, Yˆt = (1 − g)Cˆt + Gˆt, yields the aggregate demand
curve:
Yˆt − EtYˆt+1 = Gˆt − EtGˆt+1 − σˇ (it − Etpit+1 − ret ) + σˇχS
[
Etτˆ
S
t+1 − τˆSt
]
+ σˇχAτˆAt . (1)
In the expression above, g ≡ 1− C¯/Y¯ = G¯/Y¯ > 0 is the steady state government spending-
to-GDP ratio. Parameter σ ≡ − u¯c
u¯ccC¯
is the IES of consumption. σˇ ≡ σ(1 − g) is the IES
re-scaled by the government spending-to-GDP ratio.
Variables with a hat are defined as: Yˆt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ), Cˆt ≡ log(Ct/C¯), Gˆt ≡ (Gt−G¯)/Y¯ ,
τˆ it ≡ τ it − τ¯ i, i ∈ {A,S,W} and ret ≡ log β−1 + Et(ξˆt − ξˆt+1) where ξˆt ≡ log(ξt/ξ¯).5 The
χS ≡ 1
1+τ¯S
, χA ≡ 1−β
1−τ¯A are constants scaling the sales and capital taxes.
The NKPC (or aggregate supply—AS curve) is given by:
pit = κYˆt + κψ(χ
W τˆWt + χ
S τˆSt − σˇ−1Gˆt) + βEtpit+1, (2)
with
κ ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)ϑ
α
;ϑ ≡ σˇ
−1 + φ(1 + ω)− 1
1 + ωyθ
; ψ ≡ 1
σˇ−1 + φ(1 + ω)− 1;
ωy ≡ φ(1 + Iω)− 1; ω ≡ v¯ll l¯
v¯l
; χW ≡ 1
1− τ¯W .
The production function is given by yt = l
1/φ
t .
6 φ governs the degree of the returns-to-
scale in technology production (φ = 1 is CRS, constant returns-to-scale; φ > 1 is DRS,
decreasing returns-to-scale). ω is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of work. ωy is
defined similar to ω but also allows for DRS (for CRS ωy = ω). χ
W scales labour taxes.
β is the discount factor which is used to discount future utilities and profit streams to the
present and θ is the elasticity of substitution among intermediary goods. κ is called the
5τˆAt is defined such that a one percent increase in capital income per year is comparable with the tax
on labour income.
6More generally the production function of firm i can be written as yt(i) = kt(i)f(lt(i)/kt(i)) where f
is an increasing and concave function. We abstract from total factor productivity, as it is not in the focus
of the present paper. Index i reflects the fact that either capital or labour can be firm-specific in our setup.
In line with Woodford (2003, 2005, 2011) we make two assumptions. First, in the case of a specific labour
market there exists a rental market for capital while the rental market does not exist in the case of an
economy-wide labour market with firm-specific capital. Second, capital is normalised to one in the case of
a specific labour market.
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slope of the NKPC.
The slope of the Phillips curve is governed by the assumption of the factor market.7
It can be shown (see, e.g. Woodford (2003) and below) that the slope of the NKPC is
smaller with a higher degree of strategic complementarity—firms adjust quantities more
than prices in response to shocks. Consequently, the impact of fiscal measures, which alter
the marginal cost in the NKPC, on inflation and expected inflation is also smaller.
An economy-wide factor market (one type of factor for all firms) implies strategic sub-
stitutability in price-setting (or, equivalently, a steeper Phillips curve) i.e. an individual
firm which experiences a rise in the prices of goods of the other firms will decrease the price
of its own good. On the other hand, a specific factor market leads to the synchronization
of prices across firms which implies a case of strategic complementarity. Strategic comple-
mentarity represents an important factor in how firms set prices (see empirical evidence
for the US by Amiti et al. (2019) and for Europe by Fabiani (2006)). An economy-wide
factor market implies a steeper Phillips curve than a firm-specific one.
Let I be an indicator variable which takes the value of one when we assume strategic
complementarity, owing to a specific labour market. The case of I = 0 corresponds to
the setup with an economy-wide labour market. ϑ < 1 means that there is some degree
of strategic complementarity which is supported by empirical evidence (see, Woodford
(2003)). The case of strategic substitutability, ϑ > 1, is not covered here because it is not
supported by data.
For φ = 1, g = 0, I = 1 the Eggertsson (2011) setup is derived. Note that only the
content of parameters σˇ, κ, ϑ and ψ changes when we generalise Eggertsson (2011) for
positive long-run government spending and DRS. Table (1) provides an overview how the
slope of NKPC (κ) changes due to the various assumptions (economy-wide versus specific
labour market and CRS versus DRS): estimates for the slope of New Keynesian Phillips
curve vary between 0.0076-0.1999 (see e.g. Linde and Trabandt (2018) for a collection of
estimates for the US). We make the following observations. First, we do not consider the
economy-wide labour market with CRS to calculate fiscal multipliers because the slope
of the NKPC in that case is out of range of the empirical estimates. Second, DRS is
a substantial source of strategic complementarity even in the case of an economy-wide
labour market. Third, a specific labour market implies a substantial degree of strategic
7Factor market means labour market in this paper. However, instead of assuming a firm-specific labour
market we can arrive at similar results under the alternative assumption of a homogeneous (or economy-
wide) labour market with firm-specific (fixed) capital and decreasing returns in production.
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Table 1: The effect of various labour market assumptions (economy-wide/specific or, equiv-
alently, steeper/flatter Phillips curve) and production technology (constant or decreasing
returns-to-scale) assumptions on the value of the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve.
Economy-wide Specific
I = 0 I = 1
CRS (φ = 1) 0.1999 0.0095
DRS (φ = 1.5) 0.0386 0.0076
complementarity with either CRS or DRS. It is important to note that the flattening of
the Phillips curve could, alternatively, occur due to a rise in price rigidity parameter as
analyzed in Boneva et al. (2016) and Ngo (2019).
Monetary policy follows Taylor rule, generalized to allow for the case of a zero lower
bound:
it = max{0, ret + φpipit + φY Yˆt}, (3)
where φpi > 1 and φY > 0 and the max operator refers to the zero lower bound on the
nominal interest rate.
3 Description of the equilibrium
We analyse a short-run and a long-run equilibrium. Initially, we are in steady state (t = 0).
Then, from time t = 1, for some interval, 0 < t < T , which we can call the short-run (see
subscript S), a shock hits the economy. That is, when t < T the shock is described by an
exogenous decrease in ret = r
e
S < 0 with T denoting the stochastic date at which the shock
vanishes.
In period t, the shock persists with probability µ or dies out with 1−µ for all t < T . In
the short-run, the zero lower bound on nominal interest can be either binding (it = iS = 0)
or not binding (it = iS > 0). In the non-binding case, the nominal interest is governed by
the Taylor rule. For time, t ≥ T , variables take on their long-run steady-state values. We
proceed to describe the equilibria under positive and zero nominal interest rates.
Positive Interest rate. We assume that inflation and output are linear functions of the
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fiscal variables, FˆS = {GˆS , τˆWS , τˆSS , τˆAS }:
piS = ApiFˆS , (4)
YˆS = AY FˆS , (5)
where Api and AY are coefficients to be determined.
The fiscal instrument F follows an AR(1) process:
Ft+1 = F
ρ
t exp(εt+1) (6)
where ρ measures persistence and ε is an i.i.d. shock with zero mean and constant variance.
The fiscal multipliers are computed separately, e.g., a sales tax cut is computed under
the assumption of no change in other fiscal instruments. Also, we assume that changes
in spending (or taxes) are offset by present or future lump-sum taxes/transfers, i.e. the
Ricardian evidence holds.
Zero nominal interest rate. In period t and t + 1 variable Xˆi = {Fˆi, Yˆi, pii} with Fˆi =
{Gˆi, τˆWi , τˆSi , τˆAi } for i ∈ {t, t+ 1} are taking, respectively, the following values:
Xˆt =
{
Xˆt = XˆS , 0 < t < T , zero bound binding,
Xˆt = 0, t ≥ T , zero bound not binding,
and
Xˆt+1 =
{
(1− µ)XˆS = 0, with probability 1− µ, Xˆt+1 reverts to steady state,
µXˆS , with probability µ zero bound continues to bind.
It is necessary to formulate conditions under which the zero bound binds. Condition C1
ensures that the shock in rS is large enough to make the zero bound binding even with an
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expansionary fiscal policy:8
ret < −
κσˇ−1(1− µ)(σˇ − ψ)φpi + [(1− µ)(1− βµ)− κψµ]φY
κµ(φpi − µ) + [1 + σˇφY − µ](1− βµ) [Gˆt − σˇχ
S τˆSt ]
− (1− µ)κψφpi + σˇµκψφY
κσˇ(φpi − µ) + [1 + σˇφY − µ](1− βµ)χ
W τˆWt
− φpiκ+ (1− βµ)φY
κσˇ(φpi − µ) + [1 + σˇφY − µ](1− βµ) σˇχ
AτˆAt
while condition C2 makes sure that the crises do not last for too long9:
L(µ) ≡ (1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ > 0. (7)
Proposition 1 In the short-run when iS > 0 and C1 does not hold, the equilibrium piS,
YˆS and iS are described, respectively, by:
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piS = AGˆS + BτˆSS + CτˆWS +DτˆAS , A,B, C,D >0 (constants), (8)
YˆS =
κψ[φpi − ρ] + (1− ρ)(1− βρ)
[1 + σˇφY − ρ](1− βρ) + κσˇ[φpi − ρ]GˆS
− κψ(φpi − ρ) + (1− ρ)(1− βρ)
[1 + σˇφY − ρ](1− βρ) + κσˇ(φpi − ρ) σˇχ
S τˆSS (9)
− κψχ
W σˇ(φpi − ρ)
[1 + σˇφY − ρ](1− βρ) + κσˇ(φpi − ρ) τˆ
W
S
+
σˇχA(1− βρ)
[1 + σˇφY − ρ](1− βρ) + σˇκ(φpi − ρ) τˆ
A
S
and
iS = i
e
S + φpipiS + φY YˆS . (10)
8This condition can be derived by substituting equations (8) and (9) into the Taylor rule, equation (A.6).
9Condition C2 also facilitates i) the avoidance of the deflationary black hole which would arise at µ¯ that
satisfies L(µ¯) = 0 and ii) ensures that the coefficient on ret in equation (11) is positive so that r
e
t < 0 is
satisfied.
10In the interest of space we do not report coefficients A,B, C,D (Aˇ, Bˇ, Cˇ, Dˇ, Eˇ). To derive the fiscal
multipliers it is sufficient to have the expressions for output.
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Similarly, in the short-run when i = 0, C1 and C2 hold, the equilibrium is as follows:
piS = AˇGˆS + BˇτˆSS + CˇτˆWS + DˇτˆAS + EˇreS , Aˇ, Bˇ, Cˇ, Dˇ, Eˇ >0 (constants),
YˆS =
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκψ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ GˆS +
σˇµκψχW
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ τˆ
W
S
− [(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκψ]χ
S
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ σˇτˆ
S
S +
(1− βµ)χA
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ τˆ
A
S (11)
+
σˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκr
e
S
and
iS = 0.
For the proof, we use the method of undetermined coefficients. In particular, we derive
equation 9 through the combination of equations 1, 2 and 10. Equation 11 can be obtained
using equations 1, 2 and iS = 0. A similar procedure can be used to generate the expressions
for inflation for both i > 0 and i = 0.
Note that the fiscal multiplier can be derived as dYˆS/dFˆS with FˆS = {GˆS , τˆWS , τˆSS , τˆAS })
using equations (9) and (11) for i > 0 and i = 0 cases, respectively. We follow Eggertsson
(2011) in assuming that the persistence parameters for the exogenous processes of fiscal
instruments equal the parameter of the probability of remaining in a ZLB scenario, ρ = µ.
An approximate equilibrium that is correct up to the first order is a collection of stochastic
processes for {Yˆt, pit, it, ret } that solves equations (1)-(A.6) given paths for fiscal policy,
{Gˆt, τˆWt , τˆSt ,τˆAt }.
4 Intuition for the multipliers
This section provides an illustration of the main mechanisms in our model to develop
intuition for the section 6, where we present results on the values of multipliers for our four
fiscal instruments, based on the calibration of our model reported in section 5.
We start by discussing why the labour demand is upward-sloping at the peculiar envi-
ronment of the zero lower bound. We then elaborate on the effects of the degree of strategic
complementarity on the slope of the labour demand.
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4.1 Upward-sloping labour demand at the zero lower bound
We build upon the intuition from Eggertsson (2011). To better understand the argument
in case of the zero lower bound, it is useful to start with describing normal times, i.e. when
the nominal interest rate is positive and is determined through an interest rate rule. In
this case, labour demand is downward-sloping relationship in the real wage-labour system.
The story could, alternatively, also be told in terms of aggregate demand (AD), which is
a downward-sloping relationship in an inflation-output system. In such setting, a decrease
in inflation implies that the nominal interest is cut more than the fall in inflation, in line
with the logic of the Taylor rule (the coefficient on inflation is higher than one, φpi > 1, see
the equation A.6). A lower nominal interest rate thus results in a lower real interest rate,
stimulating aggregate demand. Thus, the labour demand or AD has a negative slope.
Woodford (2011) provides an alternative explanation for why, at positive interest rates,
the government spending multiplier is equal to at most exactly one or below one at positive
interest rates in the sticky-price model. The intuition for this proceeds as follows. The
multiplier is exactly one as long as the real interest rate is fixed because consumption will
not change through the Euler equation (the negative wealth effect of higher government
spending on private consumption is eliminated). Then the spending multiplier can be
simply derived from the aggregate resource constraint and takes on the value of one. When
the real interest rate is allowed to change then higher spending will trigger a higher nominal
and, thus, through the Taylor rule, real interest rate, crowding out private consumption.
In this case, the multiplier is typically lower than one, as long as consumption and hours
worked are separable in the utility function implying that they are substitutes11.
The previous intuition changes at the zero lower bound: a reduction in inflation is no
longer counteracted by the Taylor rule. When the nominal interest rate is fixed, a defla-
tionary policy implies higher real interest rates, depressing labour demand and aggregate
demand. Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the effects of higher government
purchases and lower taxes on labour demand and supply at the zero lower bound. The left
(right) panel of Figure 1 shows the effects of higher government purchases (lower labour
taxes) on the labour demand and supply. The initial situation is denoted by solid lines.
The labour tax-cut does not have an effect on the labour demand (or AD) equation while
government purchases affects both LD and LS.
11Complementarity between consumption and hours worked can imply a multiplier of one or slightly
higher than one with positive interest rates, see the discussion of Christiano et al. (2011).
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Figure 1: Labour demand and supply at the zero lower bound
Notes: Left panel: an increase in government spending. Right panel: a decrease in labour
tax. In both panels LD refers to labour demand while LS is labour supply. Spec. refers to
specific while ec-wide refers to economy-wide labour market. An increase in government
spending shifts both LS and LD to the right while the labour tax-cut shifts only the labour
supply. The higher is strategic complementarity in price-setting (the case of specific labour
market relative to economy-wide labour market) the steeper is the labour demand and the
flatter is the Phillips curve.
A labour tax-cut which reduces marginal costs12, shifts labour supply to the right, and
is thus deflationary. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of New Keynesian models in
normal times, the model predicts that cuts in the payroll tax are contractionary at the
zero lower bound.
Next, we proceed to study the effects of higher government expenditure which affects
both LD and LS. Higher government spending has a strong negative wealth effect, making
the representative household reduce consumption and leisure, as both of them are normal
goods. The decrease in leisure automatically leads to a rise hours worked, as the time
endowment is fixed. In other words, the household wants to insure against the negative
wealth effect by working more (LS shifts to the right). Despite crowding out consumption,
the higher government spending raises aggregate demand overall, which would induce firms
to raise their prices in a flexible price environment. However, because firms face nominal
12In our setup there is no technology shock, and production is a function of labour input only, so the real
wage equals real marginal costs.
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rigidities in their price setting, output is demand determined, and firms respond to higher
aggregate demand by producing more: they demand more labour, so that LD shifts to the
right.
4.2 The degree of strategic complementarity and the size of multipliers
To highlight the importance of the degree of strategic complementarity for the size of
fiscal multipliers we study the labour market equilibrium analytically and graphically.
Combining the log-linear Euler equation, the NKPC and market clearing equations, we
obtain the inverse labour demand curve:
WˆS = Λµφ
−1NˆS − Λ(1− µ)−1reS − Λσˇ−1GˆS + ΛχS τˆSS − ΛχA(1− µ)−1τˆAS (12)
where Λ ≡ 1−β(1−µ)κψ . Equation 12 shows that the slope of the labour demand is influenced
by the degree of strategic complementarity in price setting. In particular, higher strategic
complementarity lowers κ, i.e., flattens the Phillips curve, which raises the slope of the
labour demand, Λ. labour demand is affected by the discount factor shock (see the reS
term in equation 12) while labour supply (see equation 13) is not. Government spending,
GˆS , labour taxes, τˆ
W
S , and consumption taxes, τˆ
S
S appear in both labour demand and
supply equations while the tax rate on bonds, τˆAS shows up only in the labour demand
equation.
Similarly, let us substitute the log-linear market clearing for consumption into the log-linear
intratemporal condition to arrive at the inverse labour supply:
WˆS =
[
ωφ+ σˇ−1
φ
]
NˆS + χ
W τˆWS + χ
S τˆSS − σˇ−1GˆS . (13)
Equation 13 shows that the value of κ does not influence labour supply. However, it enters
labour demand through Λ. For the rest of this sub-section we assume that there is DRS
in both types of labour market. It remains true that strategic complementarity is higher
with firm-specific labour market. Formally, this means that the value of κ in case of an
economy-wide labour market –denoted as κew– is higher than the κ under firm-specific
labour market – denoted κsp):
κsp < κew. (14)
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To see why inequality (14) is true one can recall the definitions of κsp and κew:
κsp ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)
α
φ(1 + ω)− 1 + σˇ−1
1 + ωyθ
; κew ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)
α
φ(1 + ω)− 1 + σˇ−1
1 + (φ− 1)θ ,
(15)
where the difference between κsp and κew lies in their denominator:
ωy ≡ φ(1 + ω)− 1 > (φ− 1). (16)
The latter is always satisfied because ω > 0. It follows that Λew < Λsp holds, and the slope
of the labour demand under a firm-specific factor market is higher than the one with an
economy-wide labour market: (
∂WˆS
∂NˆS
)
ew
<
(
∂WˆS
∂NˆS
)
sp
.
Looking at the labour demand (LD) and supply (LS) equations (12) and (13) we find:
(σˇ−1)LS < (Λσˇ−1)LD−ew < (Λσˇ−1)LD−sp. (17)
Let us return to the case of an increase in government spending, which is depicted on
the left panel of Figure (1). The relation in equation (17) tells us that a rise in government
purchases will change wages more, ceteris paribus, through the labour demand (see the
constant terms multiplying GˆS in equation (12)) in the specific labor market case relative
to the economy wide case. Hence, the labour demand curve in the firm-specific labour
market setting (LD − sp) shifts to the right by more than the labour demand under the
economy-wide factor market (LD − ew see dashed-dotted line). The relation in equation
(17) also indicates that labor supply shifts less than labor demands (with either economy-
wide or firm-specific labor markets).
Figure (1) also shows that labour expands more under the economy-wide factor market
as the labour demand curve in the economy wide case is flatter than the firm-specific one
(see equilibrium points B2 and B1, respectively). Overall, we conclude that the rise in
labour demand and supply due to higher government purchases leads to higher output
produced under economy-wide labour market relative to the firm-specific labour market.
Intuitively, the higher is the slope of the NKPC, the higher is the rise in inflation, resulting
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from increases in the marginal cost (through the NKPC) and, thus, the lower is the real
interest rate stimulating private spending at the ZLB.
The right panel of Figure (1) displays the effects of a cut in labour taxes. The labour
tax rate appears only in the labour supply equation, so that labour demand is not affected.
Due to the fact that labour demand in the economy-wide case is flatter, the rightward shift
of the labour leads to larger recession (see equilibrium point B2) relative to the specific
factor market outcome (B1).13 Alternatively, this can be explained as follows. The labour
tax cut decreases marginal costs, and thus leads to a drop in inflation. This drop is larger
in case of a steeper Phillips curve, so that it causes a deeper recession in the case of the
economy-wide labour market. Note that the sales tax cut works similar to the increase in
government spending, but has smaller positive effects. Capital tax cuts are deflationary,
similar to labour tax cuts, but lead to multipliers close to zero.
4.3 The effects of the returns-to-scale on the value of the multiplier
The assumption of either CRS or DRS technology is equivalent to assuming a lower or
higher degree of strategic complementarity, respectively, and the previous arguments ap-
ply. Returns to scale are governed by parameter φ, where 1/φ is the coefficient on labour in
the production function, yt = l
1/φ
t . Having previously defined parameter ωy ≡ φ(1+Iω)−1,
one can shown that under CRS, with φ = 1, ωy ≡ 0 for the case of an economy-wide labour
market (I = 0), and, ωy ≡ ω, for the case of a specific labour market (I = 1). Instead,
under DRS, with φ > 1, ωy ≡ φ−1 for the case of an economy-wide labour market (I = 0),
and, ωy ≡ φ(1+ω)−1, for the case of a specific labour market (I = 1). It can thus be seen
that, ωy is, for each labour market assumption, larger in the case of DRS compared to CRS,
so that according to equation (15) the Phillips curve slope is smaller. This is also sum-
marised in Table 2. It is important to note that the economy wide labour market with DRS
delivers a lower degree of strategic complementarity than specific labour market with CRS.
13Note that, at the zero lower bound, the response of labour to a payroll tax decrease is undoubtedly
negative for the case of the linear solution described here (due to the omission of labour contracts from
the model, i.e. lack of a downward nominal wage rigidity). This is also the case in the linear solution of
Eggertsson (2011). More generally, however, this may not be the case in the exact nonlinear environment.
Boneva et al. (2016) show that, when using a fully nonlinear solution, a payroll tax cut leads to an increase
in employment. We confirm the results of Boneva et al. (2016) using our global solution: based on the
scenario computed in Table 5, we find that employment indeed slightly increases in response to the payroll
tax decrease at the zero lower bound. Section 7 discusses our robustness checks and implied results on fiscal
multipliers from the global method in detail.
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4.4 Introducing positive government purchases-to-GDP ratio
Instead of assuming zero government spending-to-GDP ratio as in previous papers (see e.g.
Eggertsson (2011) and Woodford (2011)) we introduce a positive 20 per cent g ratio, which
is in line with post-war US data. This also helps us to have a more reasonable calibration
for the steady-state consumption-to-GDP ratio. The introduction of a positive government
purchases-to-GDP ratio (g > 0) modifies the slopes of the demand and the supply of labour
as well as re-scales the size of the government spending. In the numerical exercises below
(cf. Table 4), we find that the introduction of g > 0 has an only minor quantitative effects
on the multipliers in case of positive nominal interest rate. However, in the case of constant
nominal interest rate the multipliers are smaller in (absolute) value when g > 0, because
positive g reduces the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and the representative
agent responds less to changes in the real interest rate by changing its consumption. One
can notice that higher g would raise the slope of the NKPC as well as the multiplier. So
there are two opposing effects. The total of effect of higher g on the multiplier is negative,
however. σˇ governs the strength of the wealth effect of the government spending shock on
consumption.
To see this more clearly recall the log-linear aggregate resource constraint, Yˆt = (1−g)Cˆt+
Gˆt and differentiate it with respect to Gˆt. We obtain the government spending multiplier
and it is apparent that it depends negatively on g:
dYˆt
dGˆt
= 1 + (1− g)dCˆt
dGˆt
The previous formula shows that the consumption multiplier, dCˆt
dGˆt
, is scaled by g. Chris-
tiano et al. (2011) explain that lower values of σˇ lead to lower government spending mul-
tipliers. In total, it seems that the second effect (wealth effect) dominates in the case of
introducing g > 0.
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5 Calibration
We follow Eggertsson (2011) who estimated the linearised model to match a 30 percent drop
in output and a 10 percent drop in inflation, as experienced during the Great Depression.
The values are summarised in Table 2:
Table 2: Parameterisation of the model
β σ ω ρ φpi φY 1/φ
0.9970 0.86 1.5692 0.9030 1.5 0.5/4 2/3
α µ g τ¯S τ¯A τ¯W θ
0.7747 0.9030 0.2 0.05 0 0.2 12.7721
Notes: g is from Christiano et al. (2011). φ is from Woodford (2003).
In addition to the ’Great Depression’-scenario, Eggertsson and Singh (2016) also con-
sider an additional empirically relevant calibration scenario, which is the ’Great Recession’-
scenario, whereby US output and inflation dropped about -10 percent and -2 percent, re-
spectively. In Table 5 we provide results based on a fully non-linear solution, for such a
’Great Recession’-sized output drop.14 In the non-linear solution of the model one needs to
assign values to the size of the fiscal shocks, which we set in the range of [0.001(1−β), 0.01],
which is consistent with the Bayesian estimates of Zubairy (2014) on post-war US data.
6 Results
Based on the calibration just outlined, we compute fiscal multipliers for a number of com-
parison scenarios, summarised in Tables 3 and 4. Four main results emerge.
Result 1. Table 3 documents, that under positive nominal interest (it > 0), the gov-
ernment spending and sales tax multipliers are higher the flatter the Phillips curve in the
underlying model, or, respectively, the higher the degree of strategic complementarity. In
particular, the government spending multiplier and the sales tax multiplier in Table 4 are
given by 0.6772 and 0.4448 respectively, for the case of a high degree of strategic comple-
mentarity and a flat Phillips curve, coming from the assumption of a specific labour market
(I = 1). In contrast, for the low degree of strategic complementarity and steeper Phillips
14The output drop of 10 percent is achieved by choosing the size of the shock that puts the economy
into a ZLB scenario, accordingly. Since we keep all parameters constant to the ones of Eggertsson (2011),
reported in Table 2, and only vary one parameter (the size of the ZLB-shock), the inflation drop is not fully
matched.
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curve, coming from the assumption of an economy-wide labour market, the resulting mul-
tipliers are lower, 0.6108 and 0.4012, respectively. This is in line with the basic intuition
on how the monetary authority reacts to the state of the economy, as described by the
Taylor rule. Under a steep Phillips curve, when an expansionary fiscal policy shifts out
the AD curve, the resulting inflation increase is relatively large. The central bank reacts
to this increase in inflation with a relatively strong increase in the nominal interest rate,
which (because this translates into an increase in the real interest rate in a world of sticky
prices) contracts output and offsets part of the fiscally-driven expansion – because of the
strong response of the monetary authority, the implied multipliers are relatively small. In
contrast, when the Phillips curve is flat, inflation rises only little in response to the fiscal
expansion, and the offsetting effect from monetary policy are mild – the implied multipliers
are larger. It should be noted, however, that, while intuitive, there is no guarantee that the
government spending or the sales tax multiplier are always larger under a flatter Phillips
curve. E.g., Linnemann and Schabert (2003) show that for very persistent government
spending increases, labour supply shifts out strongly, due to the negative wealth effect of
the government spending shock (leisure decreases, so one has to work more). Recall from
Figure 1 that the economy-wide labour market (the steep PC scenario) implied a flat LD
curve. If the outward shift in labour supply is large because of a large negative wealth
effect, it may actually be the case that the real wage, and, in consequence, marginal cost
and inflation, all decrease. In this case, the endogenous response of monetary policy implies
that the multiplier is larger for a steeper Phillips curve. Miao and Ngo (2019) and Ngo
(2019) similarly document the described nonlinearities of the multiplier with respect to
the persistence of the government spending shock. Even if we have now discussed various
reasons for the directions in which fiscal multipliers differ across steep versus flat Phillips
curve slopes, we want to emphasize that, overall, our results from Tables 3 and 4 indi-
cate, that, in normal times, at positive interest rates, fiscal multipliers are similar across
scenarios; the quantitative differences in the various multipliers in normal times are minor.
Result 2. When the zero lower bound on nominal interest becomes binding, the
government spending, and the sales tax cut multipliers are higher in the case of a steeper
slope of the Phillips curve, or, equivalently with a lower degree of strategic complementarity.
Table 3 shows this to be the case for the economy-wide labour markets (I = 0, steep
PC, low degree of strategic complementarity): the spending multiplier equals 1.7350, the
labour tax cut multiplier −0.3219, and the sales tax cut multiplier 1.1396. For the case of
the firm-specific (I = 1, flat PC, high degree of strategic complementarity) the resulting
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Table 3: Fiscal multipliers with high (I = 1: specific labour market; flat Phillips curve)
and low (I = 0: economy-wide labour market; steep Phillips curve) degree of strategic
complementarity
outside ZLB, DRS ZLB, DRS
Strategic complementarity:
High degree Low degree High degree Low degree
(I = 1) (I = 0) (I = 1) (I = 0)
Multipliers (flat PC) (steep PC) (flat PC) (steep PC)
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g > 0 0.6772 0.6108 1.0767 1.7350
Payroll tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂Wt
0.0173 0.0706 -0.0336 -0.3219
Sales tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂St
0.4448 0.4012 0.7073 1.1396
Capital tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂At
-0.0068 -0.0055 -0.0115 -0.0218
Notes: For the estimated value of µ in Eggertsson (2011) (our baseline calibration),
condition C2 is not satisfied in case of a lower degree of strategic complementarity.
Hence, the comparison is accomplished using a lower value of µ = .8 from
Christiano et al. (2011). The comparison is made for the case of DRS because
C2 in the case of CRS and a lower degree of strategic complementarity is satisfied
for the maximum of µ = .69 which may be empirically implausible.
Table 4: The effect of constant-returns-to-scale (CRS, φ = 1: steep Phillips curve) versus
decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRS, φ = 1.5: flat Phillips curve), and the effect of positive
government spending-to-GDP ratio on the multipliers
Constant Returns Decreasing Returns
(steep PC) (flat PC)
Multipliers no ZLB ZLB no ZLB ZLB
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g = 0 0.4650 2.2858 0.4447 1.9464
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g > 0 0.5208 1.8182 0.5013 1.6366
Payroll tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂Wt
0.0815 -1.0242 0.0472 -0.4145
Sales tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂St
0.3818 1.8768 0.3659 1.5982
Capital tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂At
-0.0104 -0.0863 -0.0107 -0.0622
Notes: Grey cells contain the values computed from the fiscal
multiplier formulas of Eggertsson (2011). Each multiplier is calculated
under the assumption of a specific labour market.
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multipliers are 1.0767, −0.0336 and 0.7073, respectively.15 This exercise implies that, in
both cases, a unit of government purchases brings more than one unit of GDP, but more
so when strategic complementarity is low. Whereas, the case of high degree of strategic
complementarity leads to an only mild multiplier effects (the multiplier is slightly higher
than one).
Further, the payroll tax-cut multiplier is less negative in the case of a lower degree of
strategic complementarity (see −0.03 in the same Table). The latter is consistent with
Christiano (2011), who finds in a model similar to ours but containing wage rigidities, that
the payroll tax-cut multiplier may be slightly negative or close to zero.
The empirical SVAR literature finds, however, labour tax cuts to have positive effects
on the economy. Using the SVAR models with different identifying assumptions regarding
tax shocks based on US data, Mertens and Ravn (2012) and Romer and Romer (2010) find
that tax-cuts are stimulative. The model in our paper does not address the problem of the
negative payroll tax-cut multiplier. Kaszab (2016) modifies the basic New Keynesian model
by adding non-Ricardian households and wage rigidity and finds that this model extension
changes the sign of the payroll tax-cut multiplier from negative to positive. Wieland
(2019) provides empirical evidence on the contractionary effects of negative supply shocks,
such as rises in oil prices and the Great East Japan earthquake at the zero lower bound.
The standard New Keynesian model predicts the opposite: negative supply shocks are
expansionary. Wieland (2019) argues that the inclusion of financial frictions in the New
Keynesian model leads to the results in line with the empirical evidence.
Result 3. When the government spending-to-output ratio is positive (g > 0), multi-
pliers are higher than with g = 0, in the case of positive interest rates for both CRS and
DRS. At zero nominal interest rate the government spending multiplier is higher with CRS
relative to DRS (irrespective of a positive or zero choice for g). In the case of zero nominal
interest rate, the difference is larger between the size of government spending multipliers
across CRS and DRS with g = 0 than with g > 0.
The comparison of the multipliers with positive or zero government spending-to-output
15Multipliers with either low or high degrees of strategic complementarity in the case of DRS are not
directly comparable with µ = 0.903 (the estimated value of Eggertsson (2011) and our baseline parametri-
sation) when it = 0 because C2 is not satisfied. Table 3, instead, uses a value of µ = 0.80, under which C2
is satisfied again.
In the absence of a specific factor market (I = 0), g > 0 and DRS (φ = 3/2) the maximum value of
µ that satisfies condition C2 is 0.85. For µ = 0.85 the multiplier is implausibly large. Hence, we use the
somewhat lower but empirically still plausible value of µ = 0.8 of Christiano et al. (2011) for comparison.
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ratio can be found in Table 4. This Table makes use of the baseline calibration of µ so that
our results are comparable to the ones in Eggertsson (2011). The models of Eggertsson
(2011) and Woodford (2011) calculate fiscal multipliers under the assumption of a zero
steady-state government spending-to-GDP ratio (g = 0). Instead, in this paper we also
consider the empirically more realistic case of positive steady-state government purchases-
to-GDP ratio and show that g > 0 has non-negligible impact on the size of the government
spending multiplier. When g > 0 the value of IES, σˇ = σ(1 − g), declines and consumers
are less willing to substitute present consumption for future consumption after the positive
government spending shock, even if the negative wealth effect forces consumers to do so.
Thus, a lower σˇ results in a smaller consumption loss and a higher multiplier when i > 0.
In contrast, multipliers in the case of i = 0 become smaller with g > 0. When i = 0,
expansionary fiscal policy leads to a rise in inflation, which –in the absence of a Taylor rule–
implies a decline in the real rate. A smaller real rate serves as an incentive for households
to consume more in the present and, thereby, increases the multiplier. However, as our
results presented in Table 4 show, this incentive is less strong with smaller a IES (σˇ < σ
due to g > 0).
Result 4. Multipliers (in absolute value) in the case of DRS are lower than those for
CRS irrespective of whether i > 0 or i = 0. The presence of DRS in production can itself
imply strategic complementarity even in the absence of a specific labour market because
DRS reduces κ (see the term, (φ−1)θ, in the denominator of κ in Equation (2)). Multipliers
in case of i > 0 do not differ a lot across CRS and DRS. However, for i = 0 we observe
that the government spending multiplier in case of g = 0 with DRS (1.94) is lower than
with CRS (2.28) and the largest is the difference for payroll tax cut (-1.02 and -0.41 for
CRS and DRS, respectively).
7 Robustness checks – results on fiscal multipliers obtained
from non-linear solution method
This section presents results from a robustness exercise with respect to the solution method.
So far, the results presented stem from a log-linear approximation, for which a closed-form
solution can be derived. A number of authors have computed fiscal multipliers also in a
fully non-linear setting16, with somewhat differing findings. While Eggertsson and Singh
16A non-exhaustive list of references includes, Miao and Ngo (2019), Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2015),
Boneva et al. (2016), Eggertsson and Singh (2016), Nakata (2016), Richter and Throckmorton (2016),
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(2016) find that multipliers from a linear model are similar to their non-linear counterparts,
other contributions have found significant differences, namely, that multipliers tend to be
smaller when computed from a non-linear method (see, e.g. Boneva et al. (2016) and Linde´
and Trabandt (2018)). As a consequence, we also derive numerical results, equivalent to the
ones presented in Table 3 and 4, but computed from a global approximation method. The
method used is time iteration (cf. Coleman (1990, 1991), which amounts to computing,
given some initial guesses, the solution to the exact non-linear system of first order and
equilibrium conditions over a grid of fixed points, and then iterating on the guesses until
convergence. We choose 31 gridpoints for the endogenous state variable (price dispersion)
and 5 gridpoints for each of the four exogenous state variables, Gt, τ
W
t , τ
S
t , τ
A
t . The
exogenous continuous AR(1) processes are discretized using the method of Rouwenhorst
(1995). We use linear interpolation for computing the solution in between gridpoints. We
iterate on guesses of the conditional expectation appearing in the Euler equation, and in
the two auxiliary equations of the Calvo price setting problem. The algorithm is layed
out in detail in Rabitsch (2012, 2016). Tables 5 and 6 repeat the exercises of section 6
and present fiscal multipliers for various scenarios from the global solution. As is well
known, in a non-linear setting, the size of shocks affects the solution and thus the size of
fiscal multipliers. Unless noted otherwise, in the computations below we set σG,t = 0.01,
στW ,t = 0.009, στS ,t = 0.009, and στA,t = 0.001(1 − β). Else, parameters take on the
values summarised in the calibration section, Table 2. Table5 presents the results for
the different degrees of strategic complementarity, from the assumptions of either a firm-
specific (I = 1) or an economy-wide (I = 0) labour market. The upper part presents
multipliers at the zero lower bound for a ’Great Depression’ scenario, where the size of the
shock that puts the economy into a ZLB is such that output drops by about 30 percent
– the table also reports the size of the ZLB-shock, and the implied drops in output and
(annualized) inflation in percent. Unfortunately, for the ’Great Depression’ scenario, the
solution for the economy-wide labour market (I = 0) cannot be obtained at the given set
of parameters. We do not find this surprising, as, in fact, because of the steepness of the
Phillips curve in the economy-wide labor market setting under the given set of parameters,
the implied changes in inflation that accompany a 30 percent drop in output, would be
enormous.17 Table 5 thus proceeds in two steps. The upper part, presenting the ’Great
Linde´ and Trabandt (2018), and Belgibayeva and Horvath (2019).
17To make this point more precisely: we also computed the sets of multipliers from a quasi-nonlinear
solution, ’Occbin’, of Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015). In this case, a solution can be obtained, and it provides
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Depression’-scenario results for the case of I = 1, allows contrasting the global results
for this case to the multipliers obtained from the linear method (summarised in Table 3).
The lower part compares multipliers from scenarios I = 1 and I = 0, for a setting where
they can be computed in both cases (a ’Great Recession’ scenario, of a ZLB-shock sized
such that a drop of output of 10 percent results; in addition, the shock sizes are scaled
by one-half their regular size). The latter scenario allows a direct comparison between the
cases of flat versus steep Phillips curves (respectively, high versus low degrees of strategic
complementarity) in the global solution. Finally, Table 6 presents the parallel set of results
for the cases of CRS versus DRS – always under a ’Great Depression’ scenario.
The following set of results emerges: multipliers in normal times, when the nominal
interest rate is positive, are roughly similar in size compared to the multipliers obtained
from the linear solution; when the interest rate is at a ZLB, the multipliers are typically
substantially smaller than under the linear method throughout. We thus confirm the
insights from Boneva et al. (2016) or Linde´ and Trabandt (2018). Nonetheless, almost
all main results established in section 6 for the linear method, as well as the ordering of
multipliers across the different scenarios, continue to hold. Table 5 documents that the
government spending and sales tax multiplier in normal times is higher under a flat Phillips
curve or high degree of strategic complementarity (Result 1). Table 5 and 6 document that,
at the zero lower bound, multipliers are larger in absolute magnitude (compared to normal
times), because the monetary authority no longer counteract the effects of a fiscal stimulus
at fixed nominal interest rates; now, a steeper Phillips curve implies a larger inflation
increase in response to a fiscal expansion, so that multipliers are larger in this case (Result
2). We continue to find that government spending multipliers computed for the case of a
positive government-spending-to-GDP ratio (g > 0) exceed their counterparts when g = 0
in normal times, at positive interest rates (Result 3). Unlike in the results based on the
linear method, this situation does not change when turning to times of a binding ZLB:
an indication of what may be the source of the difficulties of solving this model-scenario fully non-linearly:
in the Occbin-solution of this scenario, an output drop of 30 would be accompanied by a 21 percent drop in
inflation. This indicates a clear counterfactual behavior of the economy-wide model version under this set
of parameters. One would, in fact, need to re-calibrate this model version, to obtain realistic scenarios of
a -30 percent output and -10 percent inflation response. Eggertsson and Singh (2016) follow this strategy,
estimating the set of parameters needed to achieve such Great Depression scenario (even though not for a
model version of economy-wide labor markets). This is, however, not our main exercise. We are interested
in portraying how fiscal multipliers are affected as the slope of the Phillips curve steepens. A re-calibration
of the economy-wide model version, so that the inflation response is more in line with the experience in the
Great Depression would then require a parameter combination that implies a somewhat less steep Phillips
curve again.
24
Table 5: Results from the global solution: fiscal multipliers with high (I = 1: specific
labour market; flat Phillips curve) and low (I = 0: economy-wide labour market; steep
Phillips curve) degree of strategic complementarity
Strategic complementarity:
High degree Low degree High degree Low degree
(I = 1) (I = 0) (I = 1) (I = 0)
Multipliers (flat PC) (steep PC) (flat PC) (steep PC)
Great Depression scenario
outside ZLB, DRS ZLB, DRS
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g > 0 0.5764 – 1.3266 –
Payroll tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂Wt
0.0240 – -0.0706 –
Sales tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂St
0.3081 – 0.4220 –
Capital tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂At
-0.0098 – -0.0155 –
Size of ZLB-shock, – – 0.1137 –
implied change in Y , – – -30.0154 –
implied change in pi – – -5.0099 –
Great Recession scenario
outside ZLB, DRS ZLB, DRS
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g > 0 0.5555 0.4928 0.8925 1.0151
Payroll tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂Wt
0.0381 0.0990 -0.0245 -0.1437
Sales tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂St
0.2925 0.2626 0.3962 0.4640
Capital tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂At
-0.0085 -0.0057 -0.0135 -0.0184
Size of ZLB-shock, – – 0.0436 0.0309
implied change in Y , – – -10.0017 -10.0000
implied change in pi – – -1.5657 -8.0830
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Table 6: Results from the global solution: The effect of constant-returns-to-scale (CRS,
φ = 1: steep Phillips curve) versus decreasing-returns-to-scale (DRS, φ = 1.5: flat Phillips
curve), and the effect of positive government spending-to-GDP ratio on the multipliers
Constant Returns Decreasing Returns
(steep PC) (flat PC)
Multipliers no ZLB ZLB no ZLB ZLB
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g = 0 0.4679 1.4380 0.4490 1.3929
Gov. spending, dŶt
dĜt
, g > 0 0.5922 1.5150 0.5761 1.4268
Payroll tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂Wt
0.0665 -0.4269 0.0387 -0.1563
Sales tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂St
0.3850 0.7988 0.3700 0.7852
Capital tax cut, dŶt−dτ̂At
-0.0109 -0.0366 -0.0111 -0.0294
Size of ZLB-shock, – 0.0184 – 0.0265
implied change in Y , – -30.0046 – -30.0006
implied change in pi – -8.3078 – -5.3877
they continute to be larger for the case of g > 0 compared to g = 0. Finally, multipliers
continue to be lower under DRS than under CRS, irrespective of whether i > 0 or i = 0
(see Result 4).
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8 Concluding remarks
We generalize the New Keynesian model of Eggertsson (2011), calibrate it to US data and
show how the size of fiscal multipliers depends on the slope of the Phillips curve. The vari-
ations in the slope of the Phillips curve we consider result from differing degrees of strategic
complementarity in price setting, from assuming either a firm-specific or an economy-wide
labour market, or from considering a constant-returns-to-scale versus a decreasing-returns-
to scale production function. Using our extended model, we calibrate two scenarios: a
scenario of normal times, with positive interest rates, and a scenario of crisis times, in
which a shock moves the economy temporarily into a state of a deep recession, at which
the zero lower bound is binding.
The previous literature finds very high fiscal multipliers when the economy is at the
zero lower bound. We show that the introduction of strategic complementarity reduces
multipliers at the zero lower bound due to the fact that higher strategic complementarity
decreases the slope of the Phillips curve and the fiscal stimulus induces less inflation and
a smaller reduction in the real interest rate, which is the driver of private spending.
Outside the zero lower bound (in normal times) multipliers are not much different either
with high or low degree of strategic complementarity and remain below one. The payroll
tax-cut multiplier is also less negative (smaller in absolute value) in case of a higher degree
of strategic complementarity at the zero lower bound. Overall, our findings suggest that
the size of fiscal multipliers are quite sensitive to degree of strategic complementarity in
price setting at the zero lower bound.
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Appendix A Technical Appendix
A.1 Abbreviations
Some notations are here to explain shorthands in this appendix:
AD = Aggregate Demand
AS = Aggregate Supply
g ≡ G
Y
steady-state government spending-to-GDP ratio
CRS = constant returns to scale technology
DRS = decreasing returns to scale technology
A.2 Derivation of the AD curve when g > 0
Note that economy-wide or specific labour market will influence the AS curve (derived in
detail below) and AD curve is only affected by the choice of g (positive or zero).
The AD curve is the loglinear version of Euler equation based on separable preferences.
The consumption Euler equation can be written as:
Et
{
u′(Yt+1 −GNt+1)
u′(Yt −GNt )
(1− τAt+1)R−1t+1
}
= β−1Et
{
ξt
ξt+1
(1 + τSt+1)
(1 + τSt )
Pt+1
Pt
}
.
In the previous equation we substituted in the aggregate resource constraint (Yt = Ct+G
N
t )
for consumption (Ct).
The previous equation can be log-linearised around the zero inflation non-stochastic
steady-state as:
Ŷt = EtŶt+1 − σˇ(it − Etpit+1 − ret ) + (Ĝt − EtĜt+1) + σˇχS(τ̂St+1 − τ̂St ) + σˇχAτ̂At . (A.1)
In the previous equation the following definitions are applied:
σˇ ≡ − uc
uccC
C
Y
= − uc
uccC
sC = − uc
uccC
(1− g) = σ(1− g),
χS ≡ 1
1 + τ¯S
, χW ≡ 1
1− τ¯W , χ
A ≡ 1− β
1− τ¯A .
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Variables with a hat denote percentage deviation from steady-state: e.g. Ŷt ≡ log(Yt/Y¯ ) ≈
(Yt − Y¯ )/Y¯ where the upper bar denotes steady-state. Note that government spending is
denifed relative to steady-state GDP as in Eggertsson: Ĝt ≡ (Gt−G¯)/Y¯ . The tax rates are
already in per cent so they are defined as deviation from their steady-states: τˆ it ≡ τ it − τ¯ i,
i ∈ {A,S,W}. The discount factor shock which makes the zero lower bound binding is
defined as: ret ≡ log β−1 + Et(ξˆt − ξˆt+1) where ξˆt ≡ log(ξt/ξ¯). Inflation is defined as:
pit = log(Pt/Pt−1).
Government spending is wasteful spending in our paper (denoted with superscript N
in Eggertsson (2011), we simply dropped the superscript N from Ĝt). We can see that
the introduction of positive g results in a redefinition of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (the original IES is σ and the redefined one is σˇ ≡ σ(1− g)):
A.3 Derivation of AS curves
A.3.1 Economy-wide labour market (g = 0 and CRS)
It is the same as in Woodford (2011) who sketches the derivation. It can also be found more
detailed in Woodford (2003). The AS curve for economy-wide factor market in Eggertsson
(2011) is achieved by setting ωθ = 0 in the definition of κ which can be found in his footnote
13.
A.3.2 Firm-specific labour market (g = 0 and CRS)
This is the same as the one in Eggertsson (2011).
A.3.3 Firm specific labour market (g > 0 and DRS)
This is the most general case and it is derived here (note that the g = 0, CRS and economy-
wide labour market are simply parameter restrictions of this more general setup). Let us
start from the FOC of intermediary firm i (this is the optimality condition of the Calvo
firm which chooses the price p∗t optimally at time t taking into account with probability α
it will stuck with this optimal price for T periods T > t:
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t λT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θ−1
YT
[
p∗t
PT
− θ
θ − 1mct,T (i)
]
= 0,
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and let us focus on the terms in the square bracket, []:
0 =
p∗t
PT
− θ
θ − 1
(WT /PT )
(1/φ)[lT (j)]1/φ−1
=
p∗t
PT
− θ
θ − 1
1+τST
1−τWT
vl(lT (j))
uc(YT−GT )
(1/φ)[lT (j)](1−φ)/φ
=
p∗t
PT
− θ
θ − 1
1 + τST
1− τWT
vl (lT (j))
uc(YT −GT )φ[lT (j)]
(φ−1)/φ
=
p∗t
PT
− θ
θ − 1
1 + τST
1− τWT
vl (lT (j))
uc(YT −GT )φ[YT (j)]
(φ−1)
=
p∗t
PT
− θ
θ − 1
1 + τST
1− τWT
vl
([(
p∗t
PT
)−θ
YT
]φ)
uc(YT −GT ) φ
[(
p∗t
PT
)−θ
YT
](φ−1)
where in the first line we made us of the definition of the marginal cost: mct = (Wt/Pt)/MPLt
with Wt/Pt meaning the real wage and MPLt denoting the marginal product of labour
derived from the DRS production function in the main text. Note that we substituted
the intratemporal condition for the real wage in the second row and used the production
function in the fourth row. The last row uses the demand curve of variety i.
Next we log-linearise the FOC18 as follows:
pˆ∗t − log
(
T∏
i=1
Πt+i
)
=
vll
vl
l¯lˆT − uccC
uc
Y
C
YˆT + (φ− 1)YˆT + ucc
uc
C
Y
C
GˆT
+
[
−θφvll l¯
vl
− θ(φ− 1)
] [
pˆ∗t − log
(
T∏
i=1
Πt+i
)]
+
1
1 + τS
τˆST +
1
1− τW τˆ
W
T .
where pˆ∗t ≡ log(p∗t /Pt), lˆT ≡ lT−l¯l¯ , YˆT ≡ YT−Y¯Y¯ , GˆT ≡ GT−G¯Y¯ , τˆ iT ≡ τT − τ¯ , i = {S,W}. Let
18Note that it is enough to log-linearise the expression in the square bracket due to the fact that the
steady-state in the squared bracket is zero and therefore all loglinear terms outside the bracket would be
multiplied by zero.
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us re-arrange some terms:[
1 + θφ
vll l¯
vl
+ θ(φ− 1)
]
pˆ∗t =
vll
vl
l¯lˆT − uccC
uc
Y
C
YˆT + (φ− 1)YˆT + ucc
uc
C
Y
C
GˆT
+
[
1 + θφ
vll l¯
vl
+ θ(φ− 1)
] T∑
τ=t+1
piτ +
1
1 + τS
τˆST +
1
1− τW τˆ
W
T
where log
(
T∏
i=1
Πt+i
)
≡
T∑
τ=t+1
piτ . In the next, we introduce notations for the elasticities:
pˆ∗t [1 + θφω + θ(φ− 1)] =
[
ωφ+ σˇ−1 + (φ− 1)] YˆT − σˇ−1GˆT
+ [1 + θφω + θ(φ− 1)]
T∑
τ=t+1
piτ + χ
S τˆST + χ
W τˆWT
where σˇ ≡ − u¯cu¯ccC CY = σ(1− g), ω ≡
vll l¯
vl
, χS ≡ 1
1+τ¯S
, χW ≡ 1
1−τ¯W .
Further, let us work again with the full expression:
pˆ∗t = (1− αβ)
∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−t
[
[1 + ωyθ]
−1m̂cT +
T∑
τ=t+1
piτ
]
=
(
1− αβ
1 + ωyθ
) ∞∑
T=t
(αβ)T−tEtm̂cT +
∞∑
T=t+1
(αβ)T−t piT (A.2)
where ωy ≡ φω + (φ− 1) = φ(1 + ω)− 1 and
m̂cT =
[
ωφ+ σˇ−1 + (φ− 1)] YˆT − σˇ−1GˆT + χS τˆST + χW τˆWT .
Let us then quasi-difference the equation (A.2) to obtain:
pˆ∗t =
(
1− αβ
1 + ωyθ
)
m̂ct + αβEtpit+1 + αβEtpˆ
∗
t+1
which together with the log-linear version of the price index,
pit =
1− α
α
pˆ∗t
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results in what we call NKPC:
pit = κYˆt + κψ(χ
W τˆWt + χ
S τˆSt − σˇ−1Gˆt) + βEtpit+1 (A.3)
where the parameters for separable preferences are
κ ≡ (1− α)(1− αβ)ϑ
α
;ϑ ≡ φ(1 + ω)− 1 + σˇ
−1
1 + ωyθ
; ψ ≡ 1
φ(1 + ω)− 1 + σˇ−1 ;
ωy ≡ φ(1 + Iω)− 1; ω ≡ v¯ll l¯
v¯l
; χW ≡ 1
1− τ¯W ,
where I is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one when we assume specific
labour market. DRS in production, φ > 1, can also induce strategic complementarity even
under economy-wide labour markets.
For φ = 1, g = 0, I = 1 the setup of Eggertsson (2011) is obtained.
For φ = 1, g = 0, I = 0 the setup of Woodford (2011) is obtained.
Appendix B Derivation of fiscal multipliers in Tables 3 and
4
B.1 Short run, positive nominal interest, i > 0
To derive multipliers under positive nominal interest rate we re-write the AD curve using
the method of undetermined coefficients:
piS = ApiFˆS , (A.4)
Yˆt = AY FˆS , (A.5)
for FˆS = {GˆS , τˆWS , τˆSS , τˆAS } and the Taylor rule
it = r
e
t + φpipit + φY Yˆt, (A.6)
to express output as a function of the fiscal variable FˆS . The fiscal multiplier is given by
AY .
36
B.1.1 Government spending
Let us substitute for pit and EtYˆt+1 equations (A.4) and (A.5) and for it+1 the Taylor rule
(equation (A.6)) in the AD formula: (see equation (A.1)):
Ŷt = ρAY Ĝt + (1− ρ)Ĝt − σˇ
(
ret + φpiApiĜt + φY Ŷt − ret
)
+ σˇApiρĜt + σˇχ
S(ρτ̂St − τ̂St ) + σˇχAτ̂At
where we used the method of undetermined coefficients—described in the main text—when
substituting ApiĜt for pit and ρAY Ĝt for EtŶt+1. The latter also made use of the fact that
government spending—similarly to other fiscal instruments—follows an AR(1) process with
a persistence parameter ρ. Under positive nominal interest rates the discount factor is not
time-varying and does not deviate from its steady-state, ret = 0.
In the next we plug in the guess for time t+ 1 variables:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρĜt − σˇApiφpiĜt + σˇApiρĜt + (Ĝt − ρĜt)
+ σˇχS(ρτ̂St − τ̂St ) + σˇχAτ̂At
where we set fiscal instruments other than government spending equal to zero (τ̂Wt = τ̂
S
t =
τ̂At = 0) and obtain:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρĜt −Apiσˇ[φpi − ρ]Ĝt + (1− ρ)Ĝt (A.7)
To proceed we need a formula that replaces Api as a linear function of AY . To do so, we
need to re-write the NKPC using undetermined coefficients. First, recall NKPC and use
equation (A.4) and (A.5) to substitute for Yˆt, pit and pit+1 together with the AR(1) process
for the fiscal shock.
(1− βρ)ApiĜt = [κAY − κψσˇ−1]Ĝt.
Then it follows that Api =
κAY −κψσˇ−1
1−βρ that can be inserted into equation (A.7):
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρĜt − (κAY − κψσˇ
−1)
1− βρ σˇ[φpi − ρ]Ĝt + (1− ρ)Ĝt
=
[
AY ρ− (κAY − κψσˇ
−1)
1− βρ σˇ[φpi − ρ] + (1− ρ)
]
Ĝt
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And
AY =
AY ρ− (κAY −κψσˇ
−1)
1−βρ σˇ[φpi − ρ] + (1− ρ)
1 + σˇφ2
And
AY
[
1− ρ
1 + σˇφ2
+
κσˇ[φpi − ρ]
(1− βρ)(1 + σˇφ2)
]
=
κψ[φpi − ρ]
(1− βρ)(1 + σˇφ2) +
(1− ρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)
Finally
AY =
κψ[φpi−ρ]
(1−βρ)(1+σˇφ2) +
(1−ρ)
(1+σˇφ2)
1− ρ1+σˇφ2 +
κσˇ[φpi−ρ]
(1−βρ)(1+σˇφ2)
=
κψ[φpi − ρ] + (1− ρ)(1− βρ)
(1− βρ)(1 + σˇφ2)− ρ(1− βρ) + κσˇ[φpi − ρ]
which is the same as the one reported by Eggertsson (2011). Note that extensions in our
paper modify the content of σ and κ. In particular, when allowing for positive g, the σ
changes to σˇ ≡ σ(1− g). Further, the introduction of either DRS or specific labour market
leads to lower κ implying higher degree of strategic complementarity in price-setting.
B.1.2 labour tax cut
Recall the AD curve:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆ = AY ρĜt + σˇr
e
t − σˇApiφpiĜt + σˇApiρĜt − σˇret + (Ĝt − ρĜt)
+ σˇχS(ρτ̂St − τ̂St ) + σˇχAτ̂At .
As we focus only on τ̂Wt only we can set τ̂
S
t = τ̂
A
t = Ĝt = 0:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρτ̂
W
t − σˇApiφpi τ̂Wt + σˇApiρτ̂Wt
and use NKPC to obtain Api =
κ
1−βρ
[
AY + ψχ
W
]
which can be substituted back to the
previous equation to arrive at:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρτ̂
W
t − σˇret −
κ
1− βρ
[
AY + ψχ
W
]
σˇ(φpi − ρ)τ̂Wt + σˇret
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or
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρτ̂
W
t −
κ
1− βρ
[
AY + ψχ
W
]
σˇ(φpi − ρ)τ̂Wt
Yˆt =
[
AY ρ
1 + σˇφ2
−
κ
1−βρ
[
AY + ψχ
W
]
σˇ(φpi − ρ)
1 + σˇφ2
]
τ̂Wt
AY =
AY ρ
1 + σˇφ2
−
κ
1−βρ
[
AY + ψχ
W
]
σˇ(φpi − ρ)
1 + σˇφ2[
1− ρ
1 + σˇφ2
+
κ
1−βρ σˇ(φpi − ρ)
1 + σˇφ2
]
AY = −
κ
1−βρψχ
W σˇ(φpi − ρ)
1 + σˇφ2
AY =
− κψχW σˇ(φpi−ρ)(1−βρ)(1+σˇφ2)
1− ρ1+σˇφ2 +
κσˇ(φpi−ρ)
(1−βρ)(1+σˇφ2)
= − κψχ
W σˇ(φpi − ρ)
(1− βρ)(1 + σˇφ2)− ρ(1− βρ) + κσˇ(φpi − ρ)
= − κψχ
W σˇ(φpi − ρ)
(1− βρ)(1− ρ+ σˇφ2) + κσˇ(φpi − ρ)
which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
B.1.3 Sales tax cut
Recall the AD curve:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆ = AY ρτ̂
S
t − σˇret − σˇApiφpi τ̂St + σˇApiρτ̂St + σˇret + σˇχS(ρτ̂St − τ̂St )
= AY ρτ̂
S
t − σˇApi(φpi − ρ)τ̂St + σˇχS(ρ− 1)τ̂St
=
[
AY ρ− σˇApi(φpi − ρ) + σˇχS(ρ− 1)
]
τ̂St
Using the NKPC Api =
κ
1−βρ
[
AY + ψχ
S
]
:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆ =
[
AY ρ− σˇ κ
1− βρ
[
AY + ψχ
S
]
(φpi − ρ) + σˇχS(ρ− 1)
]
τ̂St
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Now we can express for AY by collecting terms on both RHS and LHS:
AY =
AY ρ
1 + σˇφ2
− σˇ κ
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ)
[
AY + ψχ
S
]
(φpi − ρ) + σˇχ
S(ρ− 1)
1 + σˇφ2
AY
[
1− ρ
1 + σˇφ2
+
κσˇ(φpi − ρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ)
]
= − κσˇψχ
S(φpi − ρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ) +
σˇχS(ρ− 1)
1 + σˇφ2
AY = −
κσˇψχS(φpi−ρ)
(1+σˇφ2)(1−βρ) +
σˇχS(ρ−1)
1+σˇφ2
1− ρ1+σˇφ2 +
κσˇ(φpi−ρ)
(1+σˇφ2)(1−βρ)
=
−κσˇψχS(φpi − ρ)− σˇχS(1− ρ)(1− βρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ)− ρ(1− βρ) + κσˇ(φpi − ρ)
=
−[κψ(φpi − ρ) + (1− ρ)(1− βρ)]σˇχS
(1 + σˇφ2 − ρ)(1− βρ) + κσˇ(φpi − ρ)
which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
B.1.4 Capital tax cut
Recall AD curve:
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρτ̂
A
t − σˇret − σˇApiφpi τ̂At + σˇApiρτ̂At + σˇret + σˇχAτ̂At
or
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt = AY ρτ̂
A
t − σˇApiφpi τ̂At + σˇApiρτ̂At + σˇχAτ̂At
or
[1 + σˇφ2]Yˆt =
[
AY ρ− σˇApi(φpi − ρ) + σˇχA
]
τ̂At
Yˆt =
[
AY ρ
1 + σˇφ2
− σˇApi(φpi − ρ)
1 + σˇφ2
+
σˇχA
1 + σˇφ2
]
τ̂At
and using NKPC, Api =
κAY
1−βρ :
Yˆt =
[
AY ρ
1 + σˇφ2
−
σˇ κAY1−βρ(φpi − ρ)
1 + σˇφ2
+
σˇχA
1 + σˇφ2
]
τ̂At
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or
Yˆt =
[
AY ρ
1 + σˇφ2
− σˇκAY (φpi − ρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ) +
σˇχA
1 + σˇφ2
]
τ̂At
And we can express for AY :
AY
[
1− ρ
1 + σˇφ2
+
σˇκ(φpi − ρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ)
]
=
σˇχA
1 + σˇφ2
Finally,
AY =
σˇχA
1+σˇφ2
1− ρ1+σˇφ2 +
σˇκ(φpi−ρ)
(1+σˇφ2)(1−βρ)
=
σˇχA(1− βρ)
(1 + σˇφ2)(1− βρ)− ρ(1− βρ) + σˇκ(φpi − ρ)
=
σˇχA(1− βρ)
(1− ρ+ σˇφ2)(1− βρ) + σˇκ(φpi − ρ)
which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
B.2 Short run, zero nominal interest, i = 0
Fiscal policy is activated (e.g. government spending is higher than its steady-state ĜS > 0)
as long as the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate is binding:
Ĝt = FˆS > 0 for 0 < t < T
e,
Ĝt = 0 for t ≥ T e,
where FˆS = {GˆS , τˆWS , τˆSS , τˆAS }.
Different from the case of positive interest rate the discount factor in this section is the
source of the deflationary shock that makes the zero lower bound on the nominal interest
rate binding and is negative, ret < 0.
Recall that the NKPC is given by
pit = κYˆt + κψ(χ
W τˆWt + χ
S τˆSt − σˇ−1Gˆt) + βEtpit+1,
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and the AD is written as:
[Yˆt − EtYˆt+1] = [Gˆt − EtGˆt+1]− σˇ (it − Etpit+1 − ret ) + χS σˇEt
[
τˆSt+1 − τˆSt
]
+ χAσˇτˆAt .
B.2.1 Government spending
The short-run AD and AS equations when the zero bound binds can be written as (ignoring
taxes):
ŶS = µŶS + σˇµpiS + σˇr
e
S + (1− µ)ĜS
piS = κŶS + βµpiS − κψσˇ−1ĜS
which latter can be expressed for inflation as:
piS =
κŶS − κψσˇ−1ĜS
1− βµ
that can be put back into the AD equation:
(1− µ)ŶS = σˇµ
[
κŶS − κψσˇ−1ĜS
1− βµ
]
+ σˇreS + (1− µ)ĜS
or
(1− µ)ŶS − σˇµκŶS
1− βµ = −
µκψĜS
1− βµ + σˇr
e
S + (1− µ)ĜS
or
[(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ] ŶS = [(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκψ] ĜS + (1− βµ)σˇreS
Then, the government spending multiplier is given by:
∆ŶS
∆ĜS
=
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκψ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ ,
which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
B.2.2 labour tax cut
Recall AS
pit = κYˆt + κψ(χ
W τˆWt + χ
S τˆSt − σˇ−1Gˆt) + βEtpit+1
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and the AD is
[Yˆt − EtYˆt+1] = [Gˆt − EtGˆt+1]− σˇ (it − Etpit+1 − ret ) + χS σˇ
[
τˆSt+1 − τˆSt
]
+ χAσˇτˆAt
The AD and AS equations when the zero bound binds can be written as:
ŶS = µŶS + σˇµpiS + σˇr
e
S
piS = κŶS + βµpiS + κψχ
W τˆWS
which latter can be expressed for inflation as:
piS =
κŶS + κψχ
W τˆWS
1− βµ
that can be put back into the AD equation:
(1− µ)ŶS = σˇµ
[
κŶS + κψχ
W τˆWS
1− βµ
]
+ σˇreS
After collecting terms we obtain:[
(1− µ)− σˇµκ
1− βµ
]
ŶS =
σˇµκψχW
1− βµ τˆ
W
S + σˇr
e
S
or
ŶS =
σˇµκψχW
1−βµ
(1− µ)− σˇµκ1−βµ
τˆWS +
σˇ
(1− µ)− σˇµκ1−βµ
reS
=
σˇµκψχW
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ τˆ
W
S +
σˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκr
e
S
Then the labor tax cut multiplier is given by:
∆ŶS
∆τˆWS
=
σˇµκψχW
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ,
which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
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B.2.3 Sales tax cut (short run, zero nominal interest, i = 0)
The AD is:
[Yˆt − EtYˆt+1] = [Gˆt − EtGˆt+1]− σˇ (it − Etpit+1 − ret ) + χS σˇ
[
τˆSt+1 − τˆSt
]
+ χAσˇτˆAt
The AD and AS equations when the zero bound binds can be written as:
ŶS = µŶS + σˇµpiS + σˇr
e
S + χ
S σˇ(µ− 1)τˆSS
piS = κŶS + βµpiS + κψχ
S τˆSS
which latter can be expressed for inflation as:
piS =
κŶS + κψχ
S τˆSS
1− βµ
that can be put back into the AD equation:
(1− µ)ŶS = σˇµ
[
κŶS + κψχ
S τˆSS
1− βµ
]
+ σˇreS + χ
S σˇ(µ− 1)τˆSS
And [
(1− µ)− σˇµκ
1− βµ
]
ŶS =
[
σˇµκψχS
1− βµ + χ
S σˇ(µ− 1)
]
τˆSS + σˇr
e
S
and
ŶS =
σˇµκψχS
1−βµ + χ
S σˇ(µ− 1)
(1− µ)− σˇµκ1−βµ
τˆSS +
σˇ
(1− µ)− σˇµκ1−βµ
reS
=
σˇµκψχS + χS σˇ(µ− 1)(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ τˆ
S
S +
σˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκr
e
S
=
[µκψ − (1− µ)(1− βµ)]χS σˇ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ τˆ
S
S +
σˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκr
e
S
The sales tax cut multiplier is given by:
∆ŶS
∆τˆSS
= − [(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκψ]χ
S σˇ
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ
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which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
B.2.4 Capital tax cut (short run, zero nominal interest, i = 0)
Recall the expression of AD:
[Yˆt − EtYˆt+1] = [Gˆt − EtGˆt+1]− σˇ (it − Etpit+1 − ret ) + χS σˇ
[
τˆSt+1 − τˆSt
]
+ χAσˇτˆAt .
The AD and AS equations can be written, at the zero bound bind, as:
ŶS = µŶS + σˇµpiS + σˇr
e
S + χ
AσˇτˆAS
Recall the NKPC:
piS = κŶS + βµpiS
which latter can be expressed for inflation as:
piS =
κŶS
1− βµ
that can be put back into the AD equation:
(1− µ)ŶS = σˇµ κŶS
1− βµ + σˇr
e
S + χ
AσˇτˆAS
And [
(1− µ)− σˇµκ
1− βµ
]
ŶS = χ
AσˇτˆAS + σˇr
e
S
And [
(1− µ)− σˇµκ
1− βµ
]
ŶS = χ
AσˇτˆAS + σˇr
e
S
And
ŶS =
χAσˇ
(1− µ)− σˇµκ1−βµ
τˆAS +
σˇ
(1− µ)− σˇµκ1−βµ
reS
=
χAσˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ τˆ
A
S +
σˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκr
e
S .
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The capital tax cut multiplier is given by:
∆ŶS
∆τˆAS
=
χAσˇ(1− βµ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− σˇµκ,
which is the same as the one reported in the main text.
Appendix C Nonlinear Model
C.1 Calvo price setting
Recall the first-order condition of the firm:
p∗t
Pt
=
Σ∞T=t(βα)
T−tλT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θ−1
YT
θ
θ−1MC
real
T (i)
Σ∞T=t(βα)T−tλT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θ−1
YT
Pt
PT
To manipulate the previous equation further we need to establish connection between firm-
specific (MCrealt (i)) and average real marginal costs (MC
real
t ). Note that in our paper we
depart from Eggertsson and Singh and allow for DRS in production with the functional
form Yt = N
1
φ
t where φ > 1; φ = 1 is the case of CRS):
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MCrealT (i) =
WT /PT
MPLT (i)
=
vl(Nt(i))/uc(.)
MPLt(i)
=
vl(NT )/uc(.)
MPLT
vl(Nt(i))
vl(NT )
MPLT
MPLt(i)
=MCrealT
vl(Nt(i))
vl(NT )
MPLT
MPLt(i)
=MCrealT
(
Nt(i)
NT
)ω ( YT
Yt(i)
)φ−1
=MCrealT
(
Yt(i)
YT
)φω ( YT
Yt(i)
)φ−1
=MCrealT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θφω [( p∗t
PT
)−θ]φ−1
=MCrealT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θφω−θ(φ−1)
=MCrealT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θωy
,
Row 2 shows that the marginal cost has two ’specific labor’ parts: one part is related to the
disutility of labour and the other part is the specific marginal product of labour. Note that
the specific labour market assumption does not require wage to be firm-specific. Row 3
defines the average marginal costMCt =
vl(Nt)/uc(Ct)
MPLt
. In the last but one row θφω appears
only in case of specific labour market. With economy-wide labour market θφω = 0. Note
that the case of CRS production function (φ = 1) delivers the specific labour model of
Eggertsson and Singh (2016). Row 4 used the relative demand for good i.
The last row marks a simple change in notation. In particular, the composite parameter
ωy ≡ φ(1 + ω) − 1 shows that the labour curvature parameter (ω) is rescaled after the
introduction of DRS in technology. Note that when φ = 1 we have ωy = ω.
Recall the first-order condition of the firm from the appendix of our paper:
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
Pt
PT
)−θ−1 p∗t
Pt
Pt
pT
= Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
Pt
PT
)−θ−1
YTMC
real
T (i)
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or
p∗t
Pt
=
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
Pt
PT
)−θ−1
YTMC
real
T (i)
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
)−θ (
Pt
PT
)−θ
YT
which can be further written using the connection between firm-specific and average marginal
cost as:
(
p∗t
Pt
)1+θωy
=
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θ−1
YT
(
θ
θ−1MC
real
T
[
Pt
PT
]−θωy)
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
PT
)−θ
YT
[
Pt
PT
]−θ
which can also be written as:
(
p∗t
Pt
)1+θωy
=
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
Pt
PT
)−θ
YT
(
θ
θ−1MC
real
T
[
Pt
PT
]−θωy)
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
1
ΠT
)−θ
YT
[
Pt
PT
]
and let us multiply both nominator and denominator by PtPT :
(
p∗t
Pt
)1+θωy
=
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
1
ΠT
)−θ
YT
(
θ
θ−1MC
real
T
[
1
ΠT
]−θωy)
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
1
ΠT
)−θ−1
YT
=
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
)−θ−1
YT
(
θ
θ−1MC
real
T Π
θ(1+ωy)
T
)
Σ∞T=t (αβ)
T−t λT
(
p∗t
Pt
)−θ
YTΠ
θ−1
T
which is the same as the expression in Eggertsson and Singh.
In the previous equation the average real marginal cost is defined as:
MCrealT =
WT /PT
MPLT
=
NωT
(YT−GT )−σˇ
(1/φ)N
(1/φ−1)
T
=
NωT
(YT−GT )−σˇ
(1/φ)N
(1/φ−1)
T
=
φY
φ(ω+1)−1
T
(YT −GT )−σˇ =
φY
ωy
T
(YT −GT )−σˇ .
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The AS curve (the recursive NK Phillips curve) can be expressed as:
Kt =
θ
θ − 1
1 + τSt
1− τWt
λξtφY
1+ωy
t + αβEt
[
Π
θ(1+ωy)
t+1 Kt+1
]
Ft = ξtC
− 1
σ˜
t Yt + αβEt
[
Πθ−1t+1Ft+1
]
Kt
Ft
=
(
1− αΠθ−1t
1− α
) 1+θωy
1−θ
C.2 Aggregation
The production function for firm j is given by:
Yt(j) = N
1/φ
t (j)
where we abstract from technology shocks.
One derives the aggregate production function by integrating over the j−goods.
(Yt(j))
φ = Nt(j)
Since the workers are all the same the sum is simply, Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nt(j)dj. Plugging in
from the demand function ((
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
)φ
= Nt(j)
Integrating over j−goods
Nt =
∫ 1
0
[(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θ
Yt
]φ
dj
Taking variables independent from j out of the integral,
Nt = (Yt)
φ
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θφ
dj
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Now expressing this equation for Yt,
Nt = Y
φ
t
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θφ
dj
N
1
φ
t = Yt
[∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θφ
dj
] 1
φ
C.3 Price dispersion
Lets define price dispersion, St:
Sφt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−θφ
dj
where 1/φ is the labor’s share in output and θ is the elasticity of substitution between
differentiated good j. Next, using the ’Calvo result’ (proportion of firms changing its
price), we can write price dispersion recursively as:
Sφt ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−θφ
dj = (1− α)
(
P ∗t (j)
Pt
)−θφ
+ α(1− α)
(
P ∗t−1 (j)
Pt
)−θφ
+ α2(1− α)
(
P ∗t−2 (j)
Pt
)−θφ
+ ...
= (1− α)
(
P ∗t (j)
Pt
)−θφ
+ α
(
Pt−1
Pt
)−θφ [
(1− α)
(
P ∗t−1 (j)
Pt−1
)−θφ
+ α(1− α)
(
P ∗t−2 (j)
Pt−1
)−θφ
+ ...
]
Sφt ≡ (1− α)
(
P ∗t (j)
Pt
)−θφ
+ α
(
Pt−1
Pt
)−θφ
Sφt−1
Sφt ≡ (1− α) (p∗t )−θφ + α (pit)θφ Sφt−1 (A.8)
where (1−α) is the probability that the firm will be able to change price. Price dispersion
can be written recursively as
Sφt = (1− α)
(
P ∗t (j)
Pt
)−θφ
+ α(pit)
θφSφt−1
Thus, we can write the aggregate production function as,
N
1/φ
t = YtSt
50
